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1. Development strategies, economic growth, and structural change  
    Over the past four decades, the development strategies adopted in Pakistan until 
recently emphasized the achievement of a high growth rate through an import-
substituting industrialization strategy.  
    The industrialization drive was provided by a combination of instruments-i.e., regime 
of import and export controls and overvalued exchange rate, public procurement of 
foodgrains at prices below the market prices in order to maintain stable food prices and 
wages in urban areas and liberal tax concessions to industry, low level of direct taxation, 
and heavy indirect taxation. By the end of the first decade, the regional and sectoral 
imbalances created by this import substitution-led development strategy began to make 
themselves felt. However, with the infusion of substantial foreign aid, which financed 
from a half to two-thirds of total investment, the pace of industrial investment kept rising 
steadily. The expansion of industrial capacity, predominantly for manufactured consumer 
goods, was achieved not only at a high cost but also led to considerable excess capacity.  
    The real breakthrough in agriculture came during the 1960s with an increase in the 
availability of water, both through canal and tubewell irrigation, and the use of new seeds 
and fertilizers-all subsidized. This partly offset the discrimination against agriculture 
resulting from the particular industrial policies pursued. There was no doubt that a 
breakthrough in agriculture in the 1960s had a beneficial effect not only on rural 
employment in agriculture, at least in early stages, but also in agriculture-related nonfarm 
rural activities and urban industry.  
    However, there were two limitations. The first was in terms of coverage. The impact of 
the green revolution was confined mainly to the irrigated areas of Punjab, Sindh, and 
parts of NWFP. The rain-fed areas of Punjab and NWFP, and the northern hilly region 
and arid lands of Sindh and Balochistan, were left behind. The second limitation arose 
from the access to credit which was essential to the dissemination of this technology 
package, strengthened by considerable subsidies on agricultural inputs. This biased the 
use of the green revolution technology mainly in favor of the large farmers.  
    Thus, the strategy undertaken during the pre-1971 period was associated with a sharp 
rise in inequality in income distribution, both regional and functional.      The 1970s, recognized as the most turbulent years in the world economy, also brought 
with them a number of important policy changes. The decision to devalue the Pakistani 
rupee and to abolish the multiple exchange rate system in May 1972 affected the terms of 
trade between the industrial and the agriculture sectors.  
    At the same time, 32 large units of 10 major industrial groups were nationalized. 
Subsequently, banking and life insurance companies, shipping, oil distribution, vegetable 
oil and even grain milling and cotton ginning industries were nationalized. The size of the 
public sector grew further through an acceleration of investment in the new public-sector 
industries.  
    The economic policies introduced during this period included an attempt to introduce 
effective land reforms. These reforms were perceived to be more vigorous than those 
implemented a decade and a half earlier, although both were carried out under the 
umbrella of martial law. The earlier land reforms were particularly handicapped by poor 
implementation that greatly diluted their impact, often through fictitious land transfers 
and the resumption of tenanted land for self-cultivation.  
    Large-scale nationalization was associated with a fall in private investment; private 
investment in 1976/77 was 56 percent of the level achieved in 1969/70; however, total 
and public investment increased in longer-term projects partly as a result of a policy to 
encourage the development of heavy and defense industries. Overall economic 
performance saw a considerable slowing down of the GDP. Remittances from the out-
migration of workers to the Middle East which started in the early 1970s and continued 
for about a decade, as well as large new capital inflows from the oil-rich Islamic 
countries helped financed investment. Also, the government pursued expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies.  
    The effect of these policies on the distribution of income was not insignificant. The 
prices of agricultural goods steadily increased although the government was constrained 
in this effort by its desire to keep down the retail prices of foodgrains in the urban areas 
while subsidies on fertilizer and other inputs continued. They did not significantly help in 
improving income distribution.  
    During the decade beginning in 1977, despite the onset of world recession in the early 
1980s, the economy was able to maintain a consistently high GDP growth rate. A large 
food deficit was turned into a modest food surplus. Growth was resumed during 1977/78, 
partly as a result of more favorable weather conditions, increased worker's remittances, 
renewed additional inflow of external resources, both direct and indirect, partly 
occasioned by the Afghan war. Private investment, however, remained depressed, and 
speculative and rent-seeking activities (including drug trafficking) greatly expanded. 
Denationalization of industries was effected only on a limited scale, and private 
investment was slow to revive.  
    With the change in government in July 1977, policies began to be gradually reversed, 
and the emphasis shifted back to the private sector. The new government privatized some of the previously nationalized industries (flour mills, cotton ginning, rice mills, etc.). It 
also de-emphasized public investment in nationalized industries. Thus, by the time of the 
second oil price increase (1979), a gradual shift in economic policy was well under way. 
The effects of the second oil price increase on the current account balance and national 
income were largely mitigated by a rapid increase in net current private transfers from 
abroad.  
    Despite continued slack in the public sector, investment grew by over 9 percent a year, 
helped by the liberalization of a few industrial controls and incentives. At the same time, 
two pro-poor policies were introduced. First, more villages were electrified during the 
first five years starting 1977 than in the previous 30 years. Second, social safety nets for 
the poor were introduced through the introduction of Zakat and Ushr system.  
    Starting in 1984/85, attempts were made to deregulate private industrial activity, 
provide energy and physical infrastructure, and pay special attention to agriculture and 
rural development; and the provision of health, education, and other social services were 
made. During this period, the fruition of public-sector investments in "heavy" industries 
and a rapid expansion in domestic demand provided impetus to industrial growth. The 
rise in foreign resource inflows and illicit exports related to the war in Afghanistan and a 
growing fiscal deficit might also have contributed to high investment growth.  
    The period of 1988&shyp;93 expanded market-friendly policies. Economic reforms, 
mainly under structural adjustment packages of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), were introduced. The privatization policy was accelerated.  
    Following the first attempt at economic stabilization (from 1979/80 to 1981/82), fiscal 
policy became more lax. The consolidated fiscal deficit increased again and reached 8.5 
percent of GDP in 1987/88. 1  A second stabilization attempt took place in 1988/89 to 
1989/90, with support from the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility. This second 
attempt did not yield lasting results, as the fiscal deficit first declined and then started to 
climb again. External reserves went down to very low level and severe short-term 
financing problem developed towards the end of 1990, leading to a large increase in 
short-term borrowing. The latest stabilization initiative started in 1993/94 with support 
from the IMF and the World Bank. The consolidated fiscal deficit was brought down 
from 8 percent in 1992/93 to 5.9 percent in 1993/94. The current account deficit declined 
from over 7 percent of GDP in 1992/93 to 3.5 percent in 1993/94. Gross international 
reserves have increased sharply.  
    During the decades starting 1959/60, Pakistan's GDP grew at rates varying between 
6.78 percent (1959/60 to 1969/70), 4.67 percent (1969/70 to 1979/80), and 5.96 percent 
(1980/81 to 1991/92); thus the slowest rate achieved was during the decade of 1970s and 
the highest rate was achieved during the 1960s (Table 1.1). This was true, even if one 
considers shorter subperiods during these decades, indicating significant external 
developments and policy changes. Until the mid-1980s, the rate of growth of GNP was 
higher than that of GDP, particularly during the 1970s reflecting the income generated from large remittances from abroad. Starting in the mid-1980s, the contribution of 
overseas remittances to the rate of growth of GNP significantly declined.  
    However, both GDP and GNP growth rates were very impressive compared to low-
income developing countries in the world, particularly in South Asia. It was the very high 
rate of growth of the population in Pakistan which brought down the per capita GDP 
growth rate to modest levels. Even though the almost 4 percent per capita GNP growth 
rate during the 1960s (3.97) was an impressive performance, per capita growth rate in 
private consumption was also impressive ranging from 3.1 percent during the 1960s to 
2.1 percent during the 1970s, and 1.3 percent during the 1980s.  
    Accompanying the economic growth was the changing economic structure. The share 
of agriculture in GDP fell from 46 percent in 1959/60 to 39 percent in 1969/70, 31 
percent in 1979/80 to 23 percent by 1992/93. The share of manufacturing rose from 12 
percent in 1959/60 to 16 percent in 1969/70, to 17 percent in 1979/80 (very little change 
in its share during the 1970s) and 21 percent in 1992/93. It was the share of other sectors, 
broadly defined as services (including transportation, communication, trade, and 
construction) that went up from 42 percent in 1959/60 to 45 percent in 1969/70, 52 
percent in 1979/80, and 55.4 percent in 1992/93 (Table 1.2).  
    The investment-GDP ratio reached 18 percent in 1969/70 having increased from 14.5 
percent in 1959/60-a ratio which has not been surpassed since then; this was financed 
almost 72 percent by domestic savings and 28 percent by external assistance. The average 
investment-GDP ratio was 16.7 percent in 1972&shyp;80 and 16.8 percent in 
1980&shyp;85. During the years between 1986 and 1992, it was around 17 percent 
(Table 1.3). The national saving-GDP ratio increased significantly between 1959/60 and 
1960/70 from 7.4 percent and 13.1 percent; it declined to an average of 10.9 percent 
during the period 1972&shyp;80 and recovered to an average of 14.6 percent during 
1980&shyp;85. Since then, it fluctuated between 13.4 percent and 16.6 percent, the 
highest percentage reached in 1987 (Table 1.3).  
    Table 1.4 provides the government's development and total expenditures during the 
entire period from 1959/60 to 1991/92.  
    A distinctive feature of the 1970s was the high level of public development 
expenditure achieved, which accounted for 8&shyp;10 percent of GNP during 
1975&shyp;79. The annual growth rate of public development expenditure during the 
period (1970&shyp;77) was 22.4 percent, compared to a decline of 1.3 percent and of 2 
percent during the two subsequent periods, viz. 1978&shyp;82 and 1983&shyp;90. The 
upsurge in public development spending during the early to mid-1970s, primarily in the 
form of investment by public enterprises, was not met by the public sector generating the 
necessary revenue to close the fiscal gap thereby created.  
    Defense expenditures increased as a percentage of GNP from 5.85 percent in 1959/60 
to 6.8 percent in 1971/72. After declining to 5 percent in 1979/80, it accelerated again 
and reached 7.3 percent by 1988/89. The rise in government expenditure also stemmed from subsidies and debt servicing.  
   
2. Trends in poverty  
    Poverty is multidimensional. One dimension refers to poverty based on the extent to 
which households or individuals in the population have actual levels of private 
consumption below a certain "poverty line", as representing a minimum acceptable 
standard of private consumption. Since the early 1970s, Pakistan seems to have made 
good progress in terms of reducing consumption poverty. But poverty also includes other 
dimensions. These relate to the extent to which a nation's population is free from 
malnutrition, premature mortality, a high disease burden, and illiteracy. These aspects of 
human development and their impact on nutritional health and educational status relate to 
the degree of access of the population to good quality basic health and education services.  
Income/Consumption-based Poverty and Income Growth  
    There have been a large number of studies on the measurement of poverty in Pakistan. 
They have frequently measured incidence of poverty for one or two, or at most three 
survey years. Moreover, they have used different definitions and methodologies, and 
have yielded results that are not strictly comparable. 2  A review of such studies (Table 
2.1 and Graph 2.1) indicate that three studies showed an increase in rural poverty 
between 1963/64 to 1969/70, while three others showed a decline; all studies showed a 
decrease in urban poverty. At the same time, per capita income during the 1960s 
(1959/60 to 1969/70) rose by 3.9 percent per annum, but rural income distribution 
improved significantly from 0.348 in 1963/64 to 0.295 in 1969/70. Urban income 
distribution slightly deteriorated or remained constant. There were conflicting trends in 
movements in poverty and income distribution, i.e. an increase in poverty was associated 
with falling inequality and vice versa. During 1969/70 to 1971/72, of the two studies on 
urban poverty, one study indicated an increase while the other indicated no change. Of 
the three rural studies, two indicated an increase while one indicated a decline in rural 
poverty. During the period (1969/70 to 1971/72), per capita income growth slowed down 
to a much lower level compared to the 1960s; at the same time, inequality both rural and 
urban, increased but per capita income continued to increase even though at a slower rate 
than in the previous period, and decline in agricultural income was slightly faster than in 
manufacturing income. Between 1978/79 and 1984/85, two additional studies indicated 
that poverty, both rural and urban, declined while per capita income grew at rates 
significantly above the previous period, faster in the manufacturing sector than in the 
agricultural sector, and at the same time income distribution worsened in the rural areas 
and remained unchanged in the urban areas (the latter figures belong to the 1979/80 and 
1984/85 periods).  
    Thus, these earlier studies covering the period from the 1960s to 1971/72 indicated 
conflicting trends in poverty, both urban and rural, in Pakistan. There was no general 
trend to declines in poverty during this period, even though a few studies did show such a 
decline. However, from 1969/70 until 1984/85, most studies show a decline in poverty, both rural and urban. The quality of data on income distribution leaves much to be 
desired; in addition to the aforementioned problems, there is limited comparability of 
studies on poverty.  
    An interesting feature of the income distribution in Pakistan is that urban inequality is 
generally higher than rural income inequality. However, the movements over time in the 
Gini coefficient in the two areas have not been uniform. While rural income distribution 
improved markedly between 1963/64 to 1969/70, the urban income distribution did not 
improve much during the same period. The decline in the urban Gini coefficient was 
much more moderate and it increased during 1963/64 to 1966/67 3  (Table 2.2).  
    Since 1970/71, the movements in rural and urban income inequalities have, however, 
been broadly similar. The Gini coefficients for both areas rose between 1970/71 and 
1984/85 (from 0.273 to 0.345 and from 0.359 to 0.379, respectively) and the differences 
between the two narrowed significantly. Between 1984/85 and 1987/88, both rural and 
urban inequalities were reduced. However, the inequality during 1987/88 to 1990/91 
again increased sharply, both overall and sectorally. The rise in rural inequality, however, 
was sharper, rising from 0.307 to 0.410 and exceeding the urban inequality ratio of 0.39.  
    One can hypothesize several reasons for changes in income distribution in the rural 
areas over time. However, it is very difficult to be certain about the degree to which these 
factors have contributed to changes in income distribution over time. During 1963/64 to 
1970/71, one reason for the decline in rural income inequalities might be attributed to the 
green revolution, which was generally scale-neutral in its initial period. In the period 
1970/71 to 1984/85, the rise in rural income inequalities could be due to adverse changes 
in agrarian structure arising from the resumption of self-cultivation by landlords and the 
increasing mechanization of agriculture in the wake of ineffective land reforms. The 
increase in inequality in the period 1987/88 to 1990/91 could be traced to the structural 
adjustment programs which included a more realistic exchange rate and higher output 
prices for major crops that tended to benefit the larger farmers. The poorer sections in the 
rural areas could, on the other hand, have suffered because of increasing prices of food 
and other basic necessities, as well as by continuing mechanization of agriculture.  
    The changes in urban income distribution indicated a different pattern. There were 
significant increases in urban inequality during 1963/64 to 1966/67 when rural inequality 
declined. Thereafter until 1970/71, there was a decline in urban inequality in line with 
declining rural inequality, but year-to-year changes between 1971/72 and 1984/85 were 
very small, after having jumped between 1970/71 and 1971/72. This rise in urban 
inequality between 1984/85 and 1990/91 in the urban areas can be attributed to the 
structural adjustment programs.  
    Given the weakness in the sample data and the widely varying definitions of poverty, 
in terms of definition of "cut-off" point in the headcount of poverty employed by 
different authors, it is difficult to consider the empirical evidence on both income 
distribution and poverty incidence as being very precise. Rather, they should be seen as 
reflecting indicative trends, to be considered in conjunction with those of other economic variables such as GDP and the sectoral growth rates in real wages that are more easily 
measurable and available with relatively greater ease. However, a more comprehensive 
explanation of divergent trends in income distribution poverty and economic growth in 
various periods continues to remain a challenging task.  
    Declining poverty during the 1970s was supported by the available data on real wages. 
The wages of unskilled urban construction workers, available since 1974/75, indicate an 
annual average rate of increase in real terms of 1.1-2.0 percent, depending on location. 
Wages of unskilled agricultural workers were collected by the Federal Bureau of 
Statistics since 1983/84. For Punjab, which contains over 60 percent of the rural 
population in the country, these series show an annual average rate of increase in real 
terms of 3 percent for regular workers and 2.1 percent for casual workers in the period 
1983/84 to 1993/94. An older wage series collected by the Punjab Economic Research 
Institute, discontinued in 1991/92, shows an average annual rate of increase in real terms 
of 3.7 percent for regular ("permanent hired") rural workers from 1974/75 to 1991/92, 
and an even higher rate of increase for casual rural workers (Table 2.3).  
    Beginning in the mid-1980s, a different set of more consistent and comprehensive 
studies on poverty have been available. They are not comparable with earlier studies for 
the 1980s. A detailed analysis of trends in poverty incidence and depth was conducted 
using data from the House Income Expenditure Surveys (HIES) of 1984/85, 1987/88, and 
1990/91 (World Bank 1995). The results are reported in Table 2.4. Based on the 
reference poverty line chosen in this report, the nationwide headcount ratio or incidence 
of poverty (i.e., the percentage of individuals in the total population with consumption 
expenditure below the poverty line) fell from 46.0 percent in 1984/85 to 37.4 percent in 
1987/88 and further to 34.0 percent in 1990/91. The poverty gap also fell, indicating a 
substantial decline in the depth of poverty. The incidence of poverty fell slightly faster in 
urban than in rural areas. In absolute terms, the number of poor people declined sharply 
from about 43.6 million in 1984/85 to 38.8 million in 1987/88, but fell only slightly more 
(to about 38.7 million) between 1987/88 and 1990/91.  
    The reference poverty line used in this report is equal to Rs 296 per capita 
consumption expenditure per month, in 1991/92 rural prices (Rs 334 in urban prices). 
This poverty line was based on the costing of a basic needs basket of goods and services. 
Other recent works have used nationwide reference poverty lines which are about 
10&shyp;20 percent lower than the one used in this report, thus yielding lower estimates 
of poverty incidence (Sohail 1994).  
    Because conclusions about poverty trends can vary depending on the specific poverty 
line used, it is important to conduct sensitivity analysis using a range of alternative 
poverty lines. This was done for a wide range of values of per equivalent adult monthly 
consumption expenditure (from about 40 percent to about 175 percent of the reference 
poverty line), spanning the range of all conceivable poverty lines (World Bank 1995). 
The fall in poverty from 1984/85 and 1987/88 was evident wherever the poverty line was 
set within the range. But the finding of a fall from 1987/88 to 1990/91 was not as robust. 
The lower the poverty line is, the less the difference between the headcount ratios of these two years. From about Rs 300 downwards (or from Rs 260 in per capita terms), the 
two curves were statistically undistinguishable. Thus, one can say that poverty in the 
1987/88 to 1990/91 period either fell or remained approximately constant, depending on 
whether the poverty line was drawn above Rs 300 per month in adult equivalent terms 
(Rs 260 in per capita terms) or below this figure, respectively (World Bank 1995).  
Trends in Poverty After 1990/91  
    Assessing trends in poverty after 1990/91 is difficult because no data on the 
distribution of household consumption (or income) are available at this time. In the three-
year period from 1990/91 to 1993/94, the annual rate of increase of private per capita 
consumption in real terms was about 3 percent according to the national accounts. If the 
household distribution of consumption had remained unchanged after 1990/91, growth of 
private per capita consumption at this rate would have resulted in a decline in poverty (as 
per the previous reference poverty line). Poverty incidence could have declined quite a 
bit, because in 1990/91 there were many households below but in the vicinity of the 
poverty line. The limited data available on wages of unskilled workers suggest that these 
wages may have increased somewhat, in real terms but not significantly, after 1990/91; in 
fact, wages of unskilled construction workers in Karachi appear to have declined (World 
Bank 1995). However, it is difficult to hypothesize that income distribution since 1990/91 
remained unchanged.  
    The geographic disaggregation of consumption poverty estimates is constrained by the 
relatively small sample size and design of existing household surveys. Disaggregation is 
possible at the provincial level, and for urban and rural areas within each province for 
1990/91 and 1991. It is also possible to disaggregate the estimates for rural Punjab, which 
account for well over half of all rural observations, into "south" and "north". The relevant 
estimates of poverty incidence based on the reference poverty line are presented in Table 
2.5 from the two most recent surveys namely, the HIES 1990/91 and the Pakistan 
Integrated Household Surveys (PIHS) 1991 (World Bank 1995).  
    Nationwide, the estimates of poverty incidence from the HIES and the PIHS are close 
(34 percent and 31.6 percent, respectively), and they show higher poverty in rural areas, 
although the difference is less for PIHS estimates.4  About 74 percent of the poor live in 
rural areas. Punjab as a whole has considerably more poverty than Sindh. Rural South 
Punjab has an extremely high incidence of poverty of close to 50 percent. This is much 
higher than the incidence of poverty in rural North Punjab (26&shyp;32 percent), and in 
rural Sindh as well (31&shyp;36 percent). 5  Depending on the survey used, the incidence 
of poverty in rural North Punjab is either about the same (HIES) or much lower (PIHS) 
than the incidence of poverty in rural Sindh.  
    Estimates for the two smaller provinces show large inconsistencies between the two 
sources. The HIES shows NWFP as being poorer than the national average with 40 
percent poverty incidence, while the PIHS yields an estimate of just 20 percent. The 
reverse is true for Balochistan, with the HIES showing a very low poverty incidence of 
22 percent, while the PIHS yields an estimate of 41 percent. Further research is needed to ascertain the poverty rankings of these provinces between themselves and relative to the 
other provinces.  
    In another study (Naseem et al. 1995), estimates of poverty (rural and urban) have been 
made for Pakistan as a whole and for various provinces. These estimates are based on 
different poverty lines for the years 1984/85, 1987/88, and 1990/91. 6  Because of a 
lower poverty line, the percentage of poor people is much lower than in the World Bank 
estimation. Also, changes in the incidence of poverty over time are different between the 
two sets of estimates. In the World Bank estimates, there is a consistent decline in the 
incidence of poverty for Pakistan as a whole between 1984/85 and 1990/91. In the 
Naseem et al. study, there is a decline in the incidence of poverty between 1984/85 and 
1987/88, following a similar trend as in the World Bank study; but between 1987/88 and 
1990/91, decline continues until 1990/91 according to the World Bank, whereas in the 
Naseem et al. study, there is an increase in the incidence of poverty between 1987/88 and 
1990/91 (Table 2.6).  
    As between regions, there are also differences in the movement over time in the 
incidence of poverty. While it declined consistently in Punjab and Balochistan, there is an 
increase in the incidence of poverty over time in two other provinces. This is true not 
only for all overall poverty indexes, but also for the rural and urban areas separately.  
Characteristics of the Poor  
    An attempt is made in Table 2.7 to relate the incidence of poverty to the employment 
profile as well as to an asset profile of the households. All households are classified into 
four broad categories: agricultural, wage earners outside agriculture, self-employed 
outside agriculture, and a residual "other". Agricultural households were further classified 
by their access to land: owner cultivators, tenants, and agricultural laborers. 
Nonagricultural wage earners were classified into "white collar," skilled/semi-skilled, and 
casual/manual workers. White collar workers were mainly employed in regular and 
secure jobs in the formal sector. The skilled/semi-skilled category included production 
workers and tradesmen such as plumbers and electricians. Casual/manual workers were 
involved in largely unskilled and casual laboring jobs with low rates of pay and insecure 
employment. The self-employed were classified by the asset value of their enterprises.  
    Poverty headcounts correspond well with level of asset holdings within both the wage-
earner and self-employed groups. White collar workers have the lowest incidence of 
poverty (22.1 percent) among the wage earners, which is very close to that of the self-
employed with assets worth Rs 10,000 or more. The skilled/semi-skilled workers have a 
higher incidence (28.1 percent), and casual/manual laborers higher still (38.3 percent). 
The self-employed are an even more diverse category, within which ownership of capital 
appears to make all the difference, though there are probably other correlated factors at 
work including human capital. Those with assets valued at under Rs 1,000 had the 
highest incidence of poverty among all groups (51.2 percent). This group, which 
comprises about 9 percent of the urban sample, are worse off than even casual laborers. The results indicate the importance of both human and physical capital in determining the 
incidence of poverty.  
    In the rural sample, 64 percent of the households are classified as agriculturists, with 
owner cultivators as the largest group (36.6 percent). Tenants, with 13.6 percent of the 
rural sample, have a high incidence (43.8 percent). Agricultural laborers, who constituted 
7 percent of the rural sample, were even worse off. Among the nonagricultural rural 
households, casual workers have the highest incidence (45.1 percent) as do self-employed 
with less than Rs 1,000 in assets (46.3 percent). The incidence of poverty among wage 
earner and self-employed households is remarkably similar in urban and rural areas.  
   
3. Agricultural growth and rural poverty in Pakistan  
Introduction  
    The pace and pattern of growth in agriculture has important implications for rural 
poverty. Nearly two-thirds of households in rural areas were employed in agriculture and 
they accounted for 6.5 percent of the rural poor. Among the households engaged in 
agriculture, 35.1 percent were below the poverty line in 1991. The evidence of poverty 
was most severe among the agricultural landless (56 percent below the poverty line), 
worse than the casual/manual workers in rural nonagricultural occupations, among whom 
incidence of poverty was only 45.1 percent, about the same as the rural self-employed in 
nonagricultural occupations with assets below Rs 1,000 or less. 7  
    Agricultural growth through intersectoral linkages stimulates growth in both rural 
nonfarm and urban industrial sector as it generates a large proportion of gross domestic 
product and an even larger share of employment. The growth in nonagricultural 
employment is linked to the growth in income in agriculture as the latter stimulates 
demand for output and labor in the nonagricultural sector.8  
    Growth in Pakistan's agriculture has been impressive, at about 3.6 percent per year in 
the last two decades or more. However, could the past rate of growth lead to a faster 
reduction of poverty-faster than the decline that has actually occurred? Could a different 
set of institutional and policy frameworks lead to a faster pace of poverty reduction?  
    The growth momentum generated by the green revolution technology was 
superimposed on rural agrarian structure and a land distribution system which conferred a 
disproportionate share of the benefits of growth on the large farmers.  
    The two salient features of Pakistan's agrarian structure were a high degree of 
concentration of owned area and a very high incidence of share tenancy. These initial 
characteristics had very important implications for the past patterns of growth and change 
in the land distribution.      The government's attempt at land reform and an absence of an efficient land 
registration market have made the functioning of a rural land market difficult. Small 
farmers are more efficient at employing labor per acre than large ones. But land remains 
quite unequally distributed, and the absence of a well-functioning land market prevents 
the transfer of land from the large to the small.  
    Land redistribution can increase absorption of labor in agriculture. As small farms use 
labor more intensively than large ones, resuming land from large owners and transferring 
to small can improve the overall absorption of labor in agriculture. Typically, land reform 
by edict does redistribute land, but it also creates an uncertainty about private property 
rights. The threat of reform may drive large owners to expel tenants, who were likely to 
become beneficiaries. Such land owners may choose to self-cultivate with the help of 
labor displacing agricultural machinery (LDAM). In such cases, if the amount of 
redistributed land is not significant, the labor-enhancing effects of redistribution can be 
dominated by the inhibiting effects of tenant eviction and labor displacement.  
    The 1959 reforms set the ownership ceiling at 500 acres irrigated and 1,000 acres 
unirrigated. The 1972 reforms further lowered the ceilings to 150 acres and 300 acres, 
respectively. The 1977 reforms were to reduce the 1972 ceilings by another 50 percent, 
but these reforms were not implemented because of the overthrow of the government. In 
practice, the reforms have not been very effective in redistributing land to tenants and 
landless. Overall, only 1.8 million hectares or 8 percent of cultivated area was resumed, 
and 1.4 million was actually redistributed. As far as implementation was concerned, the 
1959 reform was more effective than the 1972 one, with about two-thirds of the resumed 
area redistributed under the earlier reform (Khan 1994).  
    In addition to redistributing land, the 1972 reform also attempted to reform the tenancy 
system in agriculture by discouraging absentee landlords from sharecropping out their 
land. First, the tenants of the landlord from whom land was resumed were given the 
highest priority in redistribution. Second, existing tenants were granted security of tenure 
by prohibiting evictions. Last, a 50&shyp;50 split in share tenancy arrangements was 
mandated for the output, and landlords were prohibited from levying any excess on or 
taking free labor from the tenants (Herring 1983).  
    The evidence seems to suggest that tenancy reform was largely on paper and, while 
landowners may not have directly evicted their tenants, they may have made the situation 
unbearable for tenants to continue (Herring 1983). On the other hand, Hussain and his 
colleagues (1992) note that the reforms appear to have had a greater impact in Punjab 
than in Sindh. Landlords in Punjab were forced to award ownership rights to occupancy 
tenants. In Sindh, on the other hand, feudal power has been deeply entrenched and 
implementation of the reforms has been weak. This has tended to create a greater 
perceived threat among Punjabi landlords of another reform in the future.9  This 
perceived threat resulted in the evictions of tenants more in Punjab than in Sindh. As a 
consequence, share tenancy has been almost completely eliminated from northern Punjab 
and is limited to 20 to 30 percent of area in other parts of the province. In Punjab, landlords have tended to increase self-cultivation of land. In Sindh, however, tenancy still 
persists in about 70 percent of cropped area (Hussain et al. 1992).  
    Faced with a strong policy bias of land reform legislation against share tenancy, the 
landlords could either self-cultivate or let the land out on fixed rent. While the green 
revolution technology raised per acre returns, it also increased the outlays needed for the 
purchase of irrigation water, seeds, and fertilizer. With severe credit constraints in the 
rural areas, the landless and small holders were unable to enter the area taken on fixed 
rent. The large holders could cash in on the high gains promised by high-yielding variety 
package through self-cultivation. The supervision constraints gave rise to the institution 
of sharecropping in the first place (Mahmood 1994); thus the managerial constraint of 
supervising a large labor force, especially on the larger farms, drove large holders to 
substitute labor for tractors. At the same time, rural labors (especially in the Punjab) saw 
a growth in employment opportunities both overseas and domestically in the nonfarm 
sector. The consequent tightening of labor market provided landowners with an incentive 
to mechanize. Punjab enjoyed a better infrastructure and marketing system; it made self-
cultivation less risky; and in Sindh which has an inferior infrastructure, on the other hand, 
old tenancy arrangements persist.  
    Tenancy reform does not seem to have arrested the eviction of tenants that started in 
the mid-1960s as a result of adoption of high-yielding variety seeds. In fact, the 
expectation of further pro-tenant legislation tended to landowners to evict tenants. 10   
11  , Table 3.1 shows that both number of farms and area owned in the tenant category 
declined between 1972 and 1980, and between 1980 and 1990.  
    Moreover, the adoption of the HYV package was widespread, albeit with some lags for 
poorer farmers across size, class and tenure in the irrigated area. This generalized 
increase in yields, however, created a large profit differential between owner-operated 
and share-cropped areas, since profits had to be shared between landlords and tenants on 
approximately 50&shyp;50 basis. This profit differential between tenanted and owned 
land worked as a strong incentive for landlords to resume their rented-out area for self-
cultivation by evicting the tenants.  
    Naseem (1982) and Hussain (1980) analyzed the period between 1960 and 1972 and 
found a disturbing increase in landlessness and concentration of operated area. It needs to 
be pointed out that the comparability of the first two censuses (1960 and 1972) is 
difficult, since the 1960 census was the only archivally-based census, while since 1972 
they have been based on sample surveys. The data, however, showed that there had been 
a polarization of area at the ends of the size scale, with a depletion in the middle. The 
concentration of operated area has increased over both periods, 1960&shyp;70 and 
1970&shyp;80.  
    Graph 1 shows the size distributions for 1960, 1972, 1980, and 1990 in four 
dimensions. It also gives the tenancy distributions for 1960, 1972, and 1980. The 
horizontal axis gives the six size classes. The vertical axis measures the percentage area 
of each size class from the total operated area. The Z axis which gives depth to the figure marks the four years, 1960, 1972, 1980, and 1990. These three dimensions give the size 
distribution for 1960, 1972, 1980, and 1990. There are six sets of four joined blocks each, 
in the figure. Each joined set denotes a size class from <5 acres to >150 acres. Within 
each joined set, there are four blocks denoting the four years, 1960, 1972, 1980, and 
1990. So each joined set of four blocks shows the proportional area of a particular farm 
size in 1960, 1972, 1980, and 1990. The height of each block indicates the proportional 
area of that farm size in that year. For instance, the first set of blocks at the origin show 
that the <5 acre size class operated 3 percent of the total area in 1960. This size class 
increased to operate 5 percent of total area in 1972. It increased further to operate 7 
percent of the total area in 1980.  
    The graph enables us to observe the changes in size and tenurial distribution over time 
simultaneously for the period from 1960 to 1980. All size classes operating 12.5 acres or 
more lost area between 1960 and 1980. Size classes operating less than 12.5 acres gained 
this area over time. There is a qualitative difference in this change between the 1960s and 
the 1970s, as compared to the later decades. Between 1960 and 1972, the two middle-size 
classes between 12.5 and 50 acres did not lose net area to the smaller classes. It was the 
two large-size classes above 50 acres that lost net area to the small-size classes under 
12.5 acres. So while inequality of operated area increased between 1960 and 1972, it was 
minimal.  
    Between 1972 and 1980, the two middle-size classes between 12.5 and 50 acres lost 
net area, while the large-size classes above 50 acres did not lose net area. So large farm 
sizes remained constant between 1972 and 1980, and small farm sizes below 12.5 acres 
gained net area. Therefore, between 1972 and 1980, inequality of operated area increased 
significantly.  
    Against this background, the most recent data on changes between 1980 and 1990 
make an interesting comparison. The middle-size classes between 12.5 and 150 acres lost 
their area. But this loss was not necessarily to the smallest size classes. The size classes 
below 12.5 acres gained area. But the largest size class above 150 acres also gained area. 
It is this gain by the largest size class over the 1980s, compared to its loss over the 1960s 
or its constancy over the 1970s, that has lead to the largest increase in concentration.  
    The major tenurial change between 1960 and 1980 is a reduction in tenant's 
proportional area in each farm size and an increase in that of owners. Between 1960 and 
1972, tenants in each size class lost area, while owner cum tenants gained. Between 1972 
and 1980, all tenants and owner cum tenants lost area. Pure tenants' area decreased in 
proportion from 43 percent in 1960 to 29 percent in 1972 to 22 percent in 1980, and 
finally to 16 percent in 1990. The total number of tenants decreased from 44 percent of 
the operators in 1960 to 35 percent in 1972 to 26 percent in 1980, and finally to 19 
percent in 1990. In other words, the proportional number of tenants more than halved by 
1990, while their proportional area virtually dropped to a third by 1990. So the 
concentration of operated area between 1960, 1972, and 1980 is explained by tenants 
falling out of the distribution and their area being resumed by the owners. By 1991, less 
than 1 percent of the largest farms (greater than 150 acres) covered 10 percent of farm area. At the other end of the distribution, about one half of all farms in the country are 
less than 5 acres but they occupy only 11 percent of the farm area (Table 3.2).  
    The creation of large farms was partly fostered by government policies that tended to 
increase the profitability of such farms, such as credit and irrigation subsidies, and 
preferential income tax treatment to agriculture.12  
    The onset of the green revolution saw a phenomenal increase in the adoption of two 
types of labor substituting agricultural machinery: tractors and threshers. By late 1970s, 
the rate of adoption of tractors was about five-fold greater than in the early years. Over 
the 20-year period (early 1970s to early 1990s), the population of tractors in the country 
increased ten-fold. An alternative measure of the degree of pervasiveness of agricultural 
machinery is the number of farms reporting use. The proportion of farms using tractors 
more than doubled between 1970 and 1980. By 1990, eighty-two percent of the farms 
reported using tractors. Threshers show an even more phenomenal increase; between 
1980 and 1990, the proportion of farms reporting thresher use rose from about one-sixth 
to more than two-thirds.  
    Ownership of farm machinery is unequally distributed. Table 3.3 shows that the 
ownership pattern of tractors and threshers in 1990 was highly skewed, with less than 1 
percent of the farms smaller than 1 acre owning tractors or threshers.  
    The rapid mechanization of Pakistani agriculture has come at a time of decreasing 
labor intensity in the sector. Employment in agriculture increased by 50 percent between 
1970/71 and 1993/94 (see Table 3.4). 13  However, value added in agriculture rose much 
more rapidly, by 300 percent. As a result, the ratio of employment to value added, which 
is an indicator of the labor absorptive capacity of agriculture, declined over the period to 
one-half its value. The decline has been monotonic over the 23-year period, except for 
two years (1984 and 1993). The ratio shows a slight increase in these two years, because 
of a failure of the cotton and wheat crop in 1984 and of the cotton crop in 1993. 
Employment in these two years did not fall proportionately as would be with respect to 
value added for two distinct periods, 1971/72 to 1978/79 and 1978/79 to 1984/85.  
    In fact, one study of trends over time indicates that rapid mechanization appears to 
have neutralized to a large extent the beneficial impacts of increases in cropping 
intensities, irrigated area, high-yield varieties, and fertilizer (World Bank 1995). In 
Pakistan, agricultural wages have seen an increasing trend over the last 25 years. At the 
same time, tractors have been subsidized. Thus, the relative price of capital to labor has 
been falling.  
    Real wages show a steadily increasing trend since the early 1970s (Table 3.5). Because 
of a general trend toward tenant eviction and casualization of the labor force during 
1960s and early 1970s, the demand for permanent hired labor fell, while that for casual 
and family help rose. There was a drop in the number of permanent hired workers from 
512,000 in 1972 to 387,000 in 1980 and there was also an increase in the participation of 
family and casual workers (Irfan 1990). Table 3.5 confirms that demand for casual workers rose while that for permanent help stagnated. The wages of permanent workers 
experienced a decline in real terms up to 1980 period.14  One implication of the 
transformation in the labor market was that agricultural work ceased to be the dominant 
activity of rural labor. Demand for casual labor tends to be seasonal. During off-season, 
the casual workers tended to work in the nonfarm sector.  
    Both demand and supply factors affected the rural labor market in the period between 
1975 and 1983. There was rapid agricultural growth as well as a take-off of emigration 
overseas. As a result, there was a general tightening of the rural labor market due to both 
supply and demand factors.  
    The period that followed (1984_1992) was also one of a slowdown in emigration and 
an increase in return migration. But real farm wages continued to show an upward trend. 
On the supply side, even though net emigration slowed down, with an increase in return 
migration, there was a shift in the occupational behavior of return migrants. Return 
migrants prefer self-employment over farm work, and this prevented the ranks of rural 
wage labor force from swelling up (Kazi 1989; Ilahi 1993). Another impact of migration 
on farm wages came from the way remittances were utilized. Remittances were 
channeled as investments into the rural nonfarm sector which increased the demand for 
labor in that sector and dampened the supply in the farm sector.  
    Government policies also played a part in the mechanization of agriculture. Targeted 
and concessionary credit tended to artificially lower the price of machinery. The 
exchange rate policies in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to overvalue the real exchange 
rate, which also lowered the price of tractor kits artificially. However, exchange rate 
reform in the early 1980s lowered the overvaluation to a point today where the nominal 
exchange rate is close to the real rate.  
    While the aforementioned government policies tended to artificially lower the price of 
Labor Displacing Agricultural Machinery (LDAM), trade and taxation policies distorted 
the price of machinery in the contrary direction. Local assemblers have enjoyed tariff and 
nontariff protection, which resulted in raising domestic purchase price of LDAM over 
international levels. However, the new Awami Tractor Scheme (ATS) has greatly 
reduced trade distortions for tractors, while those for threshers persisted.  
    Overall, the ATS has significantly reduced the protection granted to domestic 
assemblers and succeeded in bringing down the farmgate price of tractors closer to 
international levels. The protection granted to threshers and combine harvesters has also 
seen a declining trend in the 1990s, though this decline has not been as drastic as that for 
tractors.  
    The ADBP is the primary lender for agricultural machinery, accounting for 93 percent 
of such lending in 1991/92. While ADBP's role in financing tractors has been significant 
since its inception, the 1980s have seen it almost completely dominating the lending for 
machinery.      About 70 percent of the tractors adopted in Pakistan since the heydays of the green 
revolution (circa 1966/67) have been financed by ADBP. The rate of tractorization in 
Pakistan peaked in the mid-1980s and declined somewhat since then. The average share 
of ADBP in total tractorization between 1984/85 and 1992/93 has been 87 percent.15  In 
1992/93, all the tractors purchased by farmers were financed by ADBP. Both interest 
concessions and noninterest concessions in the form of lowering of down payment, a 
discount on price, paid by ADBP, and extension of repayment period of tractor loans 
have been responsible for the dominant role of ADBP in tractorization in Pakistan.  
    Targeted agricultural credit has largely gone to large farmers. Large farmers employ 
less labor per acre than do small ones. In the absence of a rental market for tractors, 
targeting credit subsidies to large farmers could have catastrophic effects on employment. 
The rental market for tractors is quite active. Thus, the labor displacing impact of targeted 
credit to large farmers is dissipated.  
    According to ADBP data, large sum loans (greater than Rs 100,000) account for about 
62 percent of total ADBP lending (see Table 3.6). The distribution of loan amount by 
farm size reveals that about 34 percent of ADBP credit flows to landowners with 
holdings in excess of 50 acres. ADBP credit for machinery also flows more than 
proportionately to large farmers. For large farmers (those with holdings in excess of 50 
acres), 38 percent of the finances for the purchase of tractors come from ADBP alone, 
with other formal institutions accounting for another 3 percent. In contrast, those with 
holdings less than 12.5 acres are able to raise only 24 percent from ADBP (World Bank 
1995).  
    Commercial banks have not fared any better in providing credit to smaller farmers, 
though they claim to have channeled a sizable share of their disbursement to small 
farmers. According to commercial bank data, those with land in excess of 50 acres 
received only 15 percent of commercial bank credit to agriculture in 1991/92, while 
subsistence farmers got 61 percent. However, the prevalence of proxy loans, family 
loans, and loans taken in the name of tenants but used by landlords result in large farmers 
obtaining a larger de facto share of production loans than is prescribed by law and shown 
in the banks' books (Qureshi 1993).  
    Cooperative societies have also fallen short of meeting government objectives of 
providing credit to the small farmer (Qureshi 1993). Corruption and incompetence have 
been the primary reasons for denying access of cooperative credit to small farmers. In 
1986, about one-third of the societies were family-owned and these had appropriated the 
bulk of cooperative credit.  
    In 1985, barely one-quarter of the institutional credit went to farms of less than 15 
acres; there was a worsening from 1973 when 31 percent of credit went to this category. 
There was a slight improvement in the number of small farmers with access to 
institutional credit between 1973 and 1985, but large farmers did appreciably better, 
resulting in a worsening in the access distribution of farm credit (Table 3.7). Thus, on the 
one whole, trade and taxation policies have tended to raise the domestic prices of tractors over international levels. Credit policies, on the other hand, have worked in the opposite 
direction; they have tended to lower the farm price of tractors.  
    Over the years, the Government of Pakistan has used a wide variety of interventions to 
influence agricultural output and input prices, both at the level of users/consumers as well 
as producers. They include such output price intervention, procurement/support prices for 
selected agricultural/food commodities, consumers' subsidies to food prices through 
rationing on public food distribution system, and export or import taxes on 
exportables/importables. In addition, subsidies have been provided to fertilizers, water, 
and credit, etc. 16  
    A debated issue has been whether the agricultural sector as a result of these output and 
input price interventions, on the one hand, and overvaluation of exchange rate and 
industrial protection, on the other, have transferred resources on a net basis to the rest of 
the economy and if so what is the magnitude. Various estimates have been presented 
regarding the intersectoral resource flow. These estimates vary widely due to the 
differences in the definition and methodology of estimating the resource flow. During 
1960&shyp;70, there was a net direct (excluding the effect of overvaluation of exchange 
and industrial protection and including only the price controls, output taxation, and input 
subsidies) transfer into the agricultural sector rather than out of it; thus direct transfer to 
the agricultural sector did not exceed 2 percent of GDP in any year, which, however, 
turned negative, constituting a transfer out of agriculture to the extent of between 
3&shyp;4 percent of GDP when the total effect, including that of exchange rate and 
industrial protection, was taken into account. During the 1970s and 1980s, direct transfer 
out of agriculture varied between 2 percent and 7 percent. The total of direct and indirect 
transfers ranged between 3 percent and 12 percent of GDP. The total transfer was always 
out of agriculture and never to the agriculture. 17  These transfers during the 1970s and 
1980s constituted a much larger proportion of agricultural value added, i.e. between 7 
percent and 36 percent of value added in agriculture. However, it is important to consider 
the offsetting expenditures by the government on the agricultural sector in excess of 
revenues directly collected from agriculture, on such items as investment, rent and 
extension, etc. In fact, during the second half of the 1960s, for a brief period, the 
government expenditures on agriculture more than compensated for price-related 
transfers. There was a small net inflow (total of direct and indirect) into agriculture. 
However, these transfers were quickly reversed. By the late 1980s, there was a decline in 
net transfers out of agriculture; by 1987 it came down to less than 1 percent of GDP, 
partly as a result of government policies to improve incentives for agriculture and partly 
due to a fall in world prices.  
    Recent estimates of resource transfer for the 1990s have not been as comprehensive as 
was done for the previous decades. One estimate for 1992/93 puts the net transfer out of 
agriculture-based only on five major crops, including input and output price interventions 
and government revenues from and expenditures on these crops (but excluding effect on 
exchange rate overvaluation) at 6 percent of agricultural gross product. However, this 
does not include capital costs of irrigation, loan defaults, and subsidy on agricultural 
loans (World Bank 1994, p. 45). This method of transferring resources out of agriculture by depressing output price below parity prices and then subsidizing inputs is both 
inefficient and inequitable. It depresses agricultural output, misallocates resources within 
agriculture as well as between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors compared to a 
situation in which transfers are made by direct taxation on agricultural income.  
    The adverse income distributional effects of the mechanism of resource transfer are 
apparent from the fact that both benefits of price and subsidy policies are likely to accrue 
more time to the large farmers with higher output and greater power to capture the 
benefits of subsidized loans and inputs. The resource transfer, whenever it occurs, is 
likely to fall more on the poor than on the rich. A recent study found that the net 
contributors to these outflows have tended to be farmers in especially poor rural areas 
such as Southern Punjab. Net recipients, on the other hand, have included mostly people 
living in the urban areas and relatively richer zones (Ali and de Kruijk 1994).  
    Rapid growth of population has constrained the growth of per capita income on the one 
hand and led to the problems of unemployment and underemployment on the other.  
    While the gross national product in Pakistan during the last two decades has increased 
at the rate of 5.5 percent, per capita income has grown at a rate of only 2.4 percent. 
Because of a continued growth of population at a high rate, the labor force has grown at a 
rate of 2.6 percent over the 1963/64 to 1990/91 period. 18  A slower growth of labor 
force than that of the population reflects the falling labor force participation rate: the 
labor force participate rate (crude activity rate) has fallen from 32.6 percent in 1963/64 to 
28.83 percent in 1990/91. Employment has increased at the rate of 2.5 percent over the 
same period, leaving the unemployment rate to vary in the narrow band of 3 to 4 percent. 
It seems that labor market adjustments in Pakistan take place via adjustments in the labor 
force participation rates rather than in the unemployment rates. 19  The elasticities of 
employment vary quite significantly not only across economic activities but also over 
time (Table 3.10). The lowest employment elasticities have been observed in case of the 
manufacturing sector.  
    The process of polarization in the size distribution of farms was likely to have affected 
farm labor demand. Labor requirements on different size classes of farms have differing 
proportions of hired labor, because of differences in production organization. Thus, for 
example, small farms fulfill a lower proportion of their labor requirement with hired labor 
compared to medium-sized farms due to a relatively greater propensity of small farmers 
to use family labor. On the other hand, large farms, while they use virtually no family 
labor, have a greater propensity to replace human labor with machines over time in an 
attempt to establish greater control over the production process and reduce risk. An 
important reason for labor displacing mechanization on large farms is that with multiple 
cropping, there has been both an increase in the frequency of peak season demand for 
labor as well as a constriction in the time period available for performing labor operations 
at peak season. It appears then that, given the propensity of the small farmers to use the 
family labor rather than the hired labor and given the tendency of the large farmer to 
adopt labor displacing mechanization, a polarization in the size distribution of farms is 
likely to dampen the growth rate in the demand for hired labor.      In a survey of the homeless population of a city, it was discovered that of the rural 
migrants who had moved into Lahore less than two years ago, a much larger proportion 
were landless laborers, compared to those who had migrated to Lahore city over 10 years 
ago (Hussain 1991). In the absence of a major policy intervention, there is, of course, a 
trend towards concentration of the growing population in large cities. One possible way 
to generate more employment opportunities is to promote informal sector and to create 
off-farm employment opportunities. No doubt small-scale activities in the unorganized 
sector and export-oriented industries are expected to generate more employment than 
similar activities at the large scale. However, this employment potential may not be 
realized because, firstly, domestic demand for goods produced by small-scale 
manufacturing sector is weak; and secondly, export prospects of the small producers are 
limited because there are limited interlinkages with large-scale producers. Accordingly, 
policy measures need to be instituted for generating adequate demand, both domestic and 
external, for the goods produced in the informal sector. Although comprehensive data on 
the dimension of growth of the nonfarm sector and its impact on the rural economy were 
not available, there was some evidence from microdata to suggest that nonfarm income 
did contribute more to household income than agricultural incomes, especially in the 
lower income groups and among the landless and smaller farmers. The rural nonfarm 
sector in Pakistan is heterogeneous in character ranging from small-scale looms industry 
to artisanal work.  
    An increasing labor force in the rural areas, not fully absorbed in agriculture, sought 
employment in the low productivity and labor-intensive rural industries that had few 
linkages with the large-scale industrial sector. Despite weak linkages in the economy and 
the lack of dynamism in the rural nonfarm sector, scattered evidence based on village-
level study indicated that the latter provided an important source for poverty alleviation 
in the rural areas of Pakistan.  
    The informal sector, both in the urban and rural areas, while providing substantial 
support to the poor as a means of augmenting their incomes, suffered from serious 
handicaps. A survey of Nadvi 20  showed that the vast majority of the small-scale 
household units had not "heard" or were not aware of any government institutions for 
technical or financial assistance to such units, which mainly catered to the needs of larger 
units. A basic flaw in the provision of assistance by such institutions was that they were 
highly centralized and based in urban areas.  
    Adam (1993) finds nonfarm sources account for 41 percent of income of the poorest 
quintile in four districts in Pakistan (Table 3.11). The share of agricultural income 
accounts for a mere 21 percent, while livestock activities generate another 22 percent. 
The share of farm income in total rises, and nonfarm income falls, as income rises. The 
proportion of households deriving their income from wage employment, both agriculture 
and nonfarm work, declines with income. A breakdown by size of holding in Table 3.12 
reveals the landless derive 47 percent of their income from nonfarm sources. This share 
declines substantially to 25 percent for those operating between 1 and 5 acres. Elahi and 
Khan (1986) also confirm this general trend in three districts of the Punjab.      Table 3.13 provides the five sources of nonfarm by income quintile group. It indicates 
the dependence of the poor on two particular sources of nonfarm income: self-
employment (trading, artisan, and construction repair shops) and unskilled labor 
(miscellaneous activities including construction, etc.). Households in the lowest income 
quintile receive more than their quintile shares of nonfarm income-32.3 and 28.7 percent, 
respectively-from self-employment and unskilled labor.  
    Two income sources-nonfarm and livestock-represent inequality-decreasing sources of 
income. This means that additional increments of nonfarm or livestock income will serve 
to reduce overall income inequality. Nonfarm income makes a relatively small 
contribution to overall inequality. Nonfarm income accounts for between 6.5 and 24.1 
percent of overall inequality.  
    Table 3.14 indicates three elements of decomposition of Gini coefficients: (1) source 
income weight; (2) source Gini (G); and (3) correlation ratio between source income and 
total inequality (R). Nonfarm income has the lowest source Gini in each of the three years 
and is thus the most equally distributed income source [row (2) of the table]. Row (3) 
reports the correlation ratios between source income and total income inequality and 
reveals that inequality in nonfarm income has a low degree of correlation with overall 
income inequality. Thus, despite the fact that it represents a large share of total income, 
nonfarm income makes a small contribution to income inequality because it has a low 
source Gini and is poorly correlated with overall income inequality.  
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